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COMMENTS
THE PROPRIETY OF REIMBURSEMENT BY MEDICARE
FOR HILL-BURTON FREE CAREt
Over half of the hospitals in the United States I have received
construction funds under the Hill-Burton Act.2 Hospitals receiv-
ing such funds are required to make available "a reasonable volume
of services to persons unable to pay therefor." - Unenforced and
largely ignored for twenty-five years, 4 the free care requirement was
revitalized in the early 1970's, primarily as a result of a series of
lawsuits by indigent persons who had been refused care by Hill-
Burton aided facilities.5
The hospitals have attempted to lessen the impact of increased
free care obligations in a number of ways,6 including seeking Medi-
care 7 reimbursement for a portion of the cost of the free care. If
f After this Comment went to press, a House-Senate conference committee
agreed on legislation amending the Social Security Act to prohibit Medicare reim-
bursement for Hill-Burton free care. See H.R. 4961, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 106,
128 CONG. REC. H6171-72 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1982).
1 FACTS ABOUT THE HILL-BURTON PROGRAM, JULY 1, 1947-JUNE 30, 1971, at
4 (HEW Pub. No. 72-4006, 1972), cited in Comment, Provision of Free Medical
Services by Hill-Burton Hospitals, 8 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 351, 352 n.9 (1973).
Approximately 7000 medical institutions have received funding under the Hill-
Burton Act. 44 Fed. Reg. 29,399 n.3 (1979).
2 Hospital Survey & Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291o (1976)).
342 U.S.C. §291c(e) (1976).
4 See Rose, Federal Regulation of Services to the Poor Under the Hill-Burton
Act: Realities and Pitfalls, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 168, 172 (1975).
5 For a discussion of the influence of court action on the development of
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) policy, see id. 172-74; see also
Note, Due Process for Hill-Burton Assisted Facilities, 32 VAND. L. REv. 1469, 1473
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Due Process] (in response to judicial action, HEW
issued regulations in 1972 and amended them in 1975).
6 The American Hospital Association (AHA) recently has sought to enjoin
enforcement of the 1979 regulations, arguing that the regulations placed an increased
burden on the hospitals in violation of the due process clause. See American Hosp.
Ass'n v. Harris, 625 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. 1980) (denying the AHA's request for a
preliminary injunction). The hospitals are not alone in criticizing the 1979 regula-
tions. See, e.g., Due Process, supra note 5, at 1494-99; Note, The Hill-Burton Act,
1946-1980: Asynchrony in the Delivery of Health Care to the Poor, 39 Mi. L. REv.
316, 318 (1979) [hereinafter cited as The Hill-Burton Act].
7 Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, popularly known as Medicare, was
enacted as part of the Social Security Amendments of 1965. Pub. L. No. 89-97,
§§ 1801-1875, 79 Stat 299 (1965) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13 95-1395rr
(1976 & Supp. III 1979)). Title XIX of the Social Security Act, popularly known
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the expense of providing free care is held to be an allowable cost,
Medicare would reimburse hospitals for a percentage of the ex-
pense based on the proportion of Medicare patients they serve,
The amount of money at issue is substantial.'
This Comment examines the propriety of reimbursement. The
clash between the Medicare and Hill-Burton Acts forms the under-
lying controversy. The problem stems from Congress's failure to
recognize and resolve the inconsistencies between the two Acts.
Its failure to integrate the laws has led to conflicting results on the
reimbursement issue. The Secretary of Health and Human Serv-
ices (HHS) 10 has consistently refused to classify Hill-Burton free
as Medicaid, which provides funding for medical care for the indigent, was also
part of the Social Security Amendments of 1965. Pub. L. No. 89-97, §§ 1901-
1905, 79 Stat. 343 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396k (1976 & Supp. III
1979)). This Comment discusses Medicare reimbursement only. Historically, for
inpatient purposes, Medicaid has followed the reimbursement principles of Medi-
care, although significant changes have occurred as a result of the 1981 amendments.
Interview with Professor V. Edward Sparer, University of Pennsylvania School of
Law (March 1982).
8 See infra Appendix and text accompanying notes 69-72. As the reimburse-
ment scheme now stands, non-Medicare patients pay the entire cost of Hill-Burton
free care. The hospitals essentially are seeking a new cost category, comprised
of Hill-Burton free care expenses, to which the Medicare reimbursement percentage
would be applied. See Iredell Memorial Hosp. v. Blue Cross Ass'n, [1981-1 Trans-
fer Binder] MEDMICAE & MEDICAID GuIDE (CCH) f 30,930, at 9866, 9868 (Mar.
6, 1981), rev'd, 4 MicARE & MznscAm GumIE (CCH) If 31,837, at 9207 (W.D.
N.C. Jan. 7, 1982). That percentage would be based on the cost of care to
Medicare patients compared to the cost to all other non-Hill-Burton patients. See
infra Appendix.
1 An assistant to the General Counsel of HHS estimated that if reimbursement
were permitted, Medicare and Medicaid would cover 50-80% of the $400 million
worth of Hill-Burton free care provided each year. Florida Hosp. Group Appeal
v. Blue Cross Ass'n, [1980 Transfer Binder] MznIcAE & M cancA GUIME (CCH)
If 30,374, at 9415 (Dec. 17, 1979).
10 The Secretary of HHS has the overall responsibility for administering the
Medicare program. The mechanism for reimbursing hospitals for care rendered
to eligible persons is as follows: Hospitals (which, along with other providers of
health care, are known simply as "providers") are reimbursed on a monthly basis
by private "intermediaries," such as Blue Cross, for the estimated cost of the care.
At the end of the fiscal year actual costs are determined and appropriate adjust-
ments are made. If a provider disagrees with an intermediary's decision regarding
reimbursement of a particular expense, it can appeal to the Provider Reimburse-
ment Review Board (PRRB). A hearing is held before the four-member PRRB
and a decision is rendered. A split decision has the effect of upholding the
intermediary. The Secretary of HHS may, on his own motion, review the PRRB's
decision within sixty days and modify or reverse it. (The Secretary has delegated
that power to the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). Reorganization
Order, 42 Fed. Reg. 13,262 (1977).) The provider may appeal either the PRRB's
or HCFA's decision to the United States District Court. 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)
(1976).
For a detailed description of the Medicare reimbursement and appeals process,
see 2 MEDrcAPm & MEDIcAre GurmE (CCH) Vf7513, at 13,150-70, 13,470-540;
42 C.F.R. § 405.452 (1980).
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care as a reimbursable cost under Medicare." The federal courts,
however, have split on the issue.
12
This Comment contends that Medicare reimbursement is in-
appropriate for a variety of reasons. The fundamental reason is
that reimbursement would be inconsistent with the purposes of both
the Medicare and Hill-Burton Acts. Medicare was designed to
provide health care financing for a specific class of persons-older
11 The PRRB originally held that reimbursement was improper. See, e.g.,
St. Francis Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Ass'n, [1980 Transfer Binder] MEDIcARE &
MEDicAID GumE (CCH) f 30,316, at 9085 (Nov. 5, 1979); Indiana Hosp. Ass'n
Group Appeal No. 4 v. Blue Cross Ass'n, [1979-2 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE &
MEDICAiD GuIE (CCH) If 30,133, at 9894 (Sept 18, 1979). Then for a time the
PRRB split 2-2 on the issue. The effect of such a split is to uphold the decisions
of the intermediary, which uniformly deny reimbursement. See, e.g., West Hudson
Hosp. v. Blue Cross Ass'n, [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDIcAID GUIDE
(CCH) If 30,936, at 9872 (Jan. 21, 1981); Metropolitan Medical Center & Ex-
tended Care Facility v. Blue Cross Ass'n, [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MEDIcAns &
MEDICAm GumE (CCH) ff 30,891, at 9717 (Oct. 7, 1980), rev'd, 524 F. Supp.
630 (D. Minn. 1981). After the Fifth Circuit's decision in Presbyterian Hosp. v.
Harris, 638 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 476 (1981), the PRRB
began to vote 3-1 in favor of reimbursement in a series of cases beginning with
John Muir Memorial Hosp. v. Blue Cross Ass'n, [1981-2 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE
& MEDICAID GumE (CCH) ff 31,492, at 9443 (Aug. 26, 1981). See also Gaston
Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Ass'n, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE
& MEDIC GumE (CCH) g 31,545, at 9686 (Sept. 11, 1981).
HCFA, however, has consistently refused to permit reimbursement, see, e.g.,
[1981-1 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAmI GumE (CCH) Iff 30,854-56, at
9640-42, and has reversed the latest PRRB decisions. See, e.g., Gaston Memorial
Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Ass'n, [1981-2 Transfer Binder] MEDIcARE & MEDICAID
GumE (CCH) If 31,637, at 10,108 (Nov. 7, 1981). But HCFA recently held that,
with respect to providers located in the Fifth Circuit, Hill-Burton free care is
reimbursable by Medicare. See Harris Hosp. v. Blue Cross Ass'n, [1981-2 Transfer
Binder] MEDicARm & MEDICAD GumE (CCH) If 31,638, at 10,114 (Dec. 11, 1981).
The deputy administrator felt constrained by the ruling in Presbyterian, noting that
"[d]espite the Court's decision in that case . . . [he] believes in the continued
validity of Medicare reimbursement policy that . . . [Hill-Burton free care is] not
reimbursable by Medicare .... " Id. If 31,638, at 10,115.
12The issue first reached the federal courts in Rapides Gen. Hosp. v. Matthews,
435 F. Supp. 384 (W.D. La. 1977) (holding that reimbursement was required),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, No. 77-3125 (5th Cir. Oct. 23, 1978)
(unpublished order) (the decision was vacated because the hospital had provided
no free care in the year in question, but simply had created an accounting entry).
In Presbyterian Hosp. v. Harris, 638 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
476 (1981), the court followed the reasoning in Rapides in holding that reimburse-
ment was required. Id. 1386-87. Since the holding in Presbyterian, the district
courts that have considered the issue have split 4-2 in favor of reimbursement.
Cases holding reimbursement proper are: Iredell Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Schweiker,
4 MEDIcArx & MEDICAID GuDE (CCH) I 31,837, at 9207 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 7, 1982);
Johnson County Memorial Hosp. v. Schweiker, 527 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D. Ind. 1981);
St. James Hosp. v. Harris, [1981-2 Transfer Binder] MEDIcARE & MEDIcAm GumE
(CCH) If 31,630, at 10,075 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 1981); Metropolitan Medical Centet
v. Harris, 524 F. Supp. 630 (D. Minn. 1981). Cases upholding denial of reim
bursement are: Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Center v. BHS, 4 MEDICAPE &
MEDICAI GumE (CCH) If 31,821, at 9108 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 1982); Harper-Grace
Hosp. v. Schweiker, [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MEDICAPE & MEDIcAIm GumE (CCH)
If 31,037, at 10,216 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 1, 1981).
[Vol. 130:892
HILL-BURTON FREE CARE
Americans.' 3 Permitting reimbursement would conflict with the
limited scope of the Act as well as the reimbursement scheme of
Medicare.' 4 Additionally, reimbursement would be inconsistent
with the intent of the Hill-Burton Act.15 As a condition for re-
ceiving federal funds for construction of facilities, hospitals agreed
to provide a reasonable volume of free care to the indigent. If
Medicare reimburses the hospitals, they will in effect be shifting
back to the federal government a portion of the obligation that they
agreed to assume. Finally, there are sound policy reasons for
refusing reimbursement-the most important being that reimburse-
ment would reduce the total volume of care available to the poor.
The first part of this Comment addresses the propriety of reim-
bursement under Medicare principles. The two theories of
reimbursement-as an interest expense on construction loans or as
an indirect cost of service-will be examined. The conflict between
these theories of reimbursement and the current regulations, the
statutory provisions, and the basic cost principles and overall pur-
poses of Medicare will be discussed.
If Medicare principles preclude reimbursement, then what the
Hill-Burton Act allows is irrelevant because there is no other exist-
ing source of funds for such large-scale reimbursement. If the
Medicare Act permits reimbursement, however, part II, which ex-
amines the propriety of reimbursement in light of the Hill-Burton
Act, becomes essential to an analysis of the issue. Part II first
demonstrates that reimbursement conflicts with existing Hill-Burton
regulations. It then shows that reimbursement would contravene
the general purpose of the Hill-Burton Act. Finally, part III
examines overall policy considerations underlying the reimburse-
ment issue.
I. THE PROPRIETY OF REIMBURSEMENT UNDER MEDICARE
The issue of reimbursement for free care provided pursuant
to Hill-Burton obligations implicates two fundamental principles
of Medicare. The first is that Medicare reimburses for both the
direct and indirect costs of providing service.16 The second is that
costs should be calculated so that "the necessary costs of efficiently
delivering covered services to individuals covered by [Medicare]
will not be borne by individuals not so covered, and the costs with
'3 See supra note 7.
14 See infra text accompanying notes 63-83.
'5 See infra text accompanying notes 98-123.
16 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v) (1) (A) (1976).
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respect to individuals not so covered will not be borne by [Medi-
care]." '1 The reimbursement question reflects the tension between
these two principles. Hill-Burton free care is provided to indi-
viduals who are not covered by Medicare,' indicating that reim-
bursement is not proper under the second principle. The pro-
viders,19 however, argue that Hill-Burton care properly should be
considered an indirect cost of providing service to all patients,
including Medicare patients.20 The propriety of reimbursement,
at least as an issue under Medicare rather than Hill-Burton, depends
on a resolution of the conflict between these two principles.
A. Hill-Burton Free Care as "Interest" on
Construction Loans
Consistent with the principle that Medicare covers both direct
and indirect costs, the regulations provide that "[n]ecessary and
proper interest on both current and capital indebtedness is an
allowable cost." 21 Some hospitals have attempted to recover the
cost of Hill-Burton free care as an interest expense on capital
indebtedness.22 The providers' argument is as follows. The costs of
Hill-Burton free care are an expense of receiving Hill-Burton
funds. Providing free care to the indigent qualifies the hospital
for an interest subsidy (or grant). Without that subsidy, the hos-
pitals would be required to pay the full market rate of interest on
construction loans-an amount that Medicare, in turn, would fully
reimburse. The cost of providing free care is simply in lieu of
interest payments and is therefore equivalent to interest.23
The attempt to recover Hill-Burton free care as an interest
expense, however, has been uniformly rejected by the Provider
Reimbursement Review Boards (PRRB),24 the Health Care Financ-
17Id.
18The hospital cannot be reimbursed for care provided to individuals who are
eligible for Medicare. See infra note 89 and accompanying text. In addition,
patients have no incentive to request Hill-Burton free care if they know that
Medicare will reimburse most of the cost of their medical care.
19 Hospitals and medical centers are known as "providers."
2 0 E.g., Rapides Gen. Hosp. v. Matthews, 435 F. Supp. 384, 388 (W.D. La.
1977), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Rapides Gen. Hosp. v.
Califano, No. 77-3125 (5th Cir. Oct. 23, 1978) (unpublished order).
2142 C.F.R. § 405.419(a) (1981).
22 See, e.g., Indiana Hosp. Ass'n Group Appeal No. 4 v. Blue Cross Ass'n,
[1979-2 Transfer Binder] MExcmAR & MEDicAm GuDE (CCH) ff 30,133, at 9894
(Sept. 18, 1979).
23 Id. 9896.
24 See, e.g., id. 9898. For a description of the PRRB, see supra note 10.
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ing Administration (HCFA), and the courts 25 as inconsistent with
the regulations.2 6  To be reimbursable, interest expenses must be
"necessary" and "proper." 27 The definition of proper requires
that interest "[b]e paid to a lender not related through control or
ownership, or personal relationship to the borrowing organiza-
tion." 28 Because Hill-Burton care is not "paid to a lender," it
cannot be considered interest under the regulations.29  Even those
courts holding that Hill-Burton care should be considered an in-
direct and hence reimbursable cost have held that the absence of
ambiguity in the language of the regulation compels the conclusion
that Hill-Burton care is not interest.
30
Although strict reliance on the language of the regulations is
open to criticism, 31 the refusal to classify Hill-Burton care as in-
terest is sound. Such a classification stretches the concept of interest
too far. In the case of grants, the free care cannot be considered
interest when no funds have been borrowed. In the case of interest
subsidies, the federal government via the Hill-Burton program,
not the hospital, pays the interest on the borrowed funds. Hospi-
2 5 For a HCFA decision, see Metropolitan Medical Center & Extended Care
Facility v. Blue Cross Ass'n, [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MEDicAI E & MEnicAm
GurDE (CCH) i 30,891, at 9717 (Oct. 7, 1980), rev'd, 524 F. Supp. 630 (D. Minn.
1981). For federal courts that have ruled on the issue, see supra note 12. For a
description of HCFA, see supra note 10.
2642 C.F.R. § 405.419(b) (1981) provides:
(b) Definitions-(1) Interest. Interest is the cost incurred for the
use of borrowed funds....
(2) Necessary. Necessary requires that the interest:
(i) Be incurred on a loan made to satisfy a financial need of the
provider...
(3) Proper. Proper requires that interest:
(ii) Be paid to a lender not related through control or ownership, or
personal relationship to the borrowing organization.
(emphasis added to § (3)(ii)).
2742 C.F.R. §405.419(a) (1981).
28 Id. § 405.419(b).
29 Rapides, 435 F. Supp. at 387. In the case of Hill-Burton grants, as opposed
to interest benefits, the regulations also preclude reimbursement because the costs
are not "incurred on a loan" nor are they "incurred for the use of borrowed funds."
See 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.419(b) (2) (ii), 405.419(b) (1) (1981).
ao See Rapides, 435 F. Supp. at 387; see also Presbyterian Hosp. v. Harris,
653 F.2d 1381, 1387 (5th Cir.) ("free care expenses are not 'interest' within the
meaning of the regulations"), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 476 (1981).
31 The providers argue that the purpose of the requirement that interest be
paid to a lender unconnected to the hospital is to prevent self-dealing and to insure
that borrowing is conducted at arms length. Because that purpose is not impli-
cated by reimbursement in this instance, reliance on the literal language of the
statute is misplaced. See Indiana Hosp., [1979-2 Transfer Binder] MEnicmpx &
MEDncAm Gumi (CCH) ff 30,133, at 9896.
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tals are on firmer ground in arguing that Hill-Burton expenses
are not interest per se, but rather an expense closely analogous to
interest that should be reimbursed as an indirect cost.
B. Reimbursement as an Indirect Cost of
Improved Health Care Facilities
1. The Argument That Hill-Burton Free Care
Is a Reimbursable Cost
The hospitals' inability to tie successfully their reimbursement
argument to a specific cost category, such as interest, does not end
the inquiry. The regulations that define reimbursable cost reflect
the statutory requirement that both direct and indirect costs 32
associated with the provision of services to eligible persons be in-
cluded.33  Thus, the hospitals argue that Hill-Burton care, if not
technically "interest," is analogous to interest, depreciation, or other
reimbursable costs. 34 The Hill-Burton care, although not provided
to Medicare beneficiaries, benefits the entire patient population,
including Medicare patients, by qualifying the hospital for funds
to replace or improve its facilities. Because the Medicare patients
benefit from the facilities, it is only fair that they-through Medi-
care reimbursement-should pay their share of the cost. The courts
in Rapides General Hospital v. Matthews35 and Presbyterian Hos-
pital v. Harris 36 found this straightforward argument persuasive.
Although the argument does possess a certain logic, it must
be rejected as inconsistent with the current regulations, the statutory
language, reimbursement principles, and the overall purpose of
Medicare.
32 Direct costs are those associated with the actual delivery of care to patients,
such as physician and nurse salaries and the cost of equipment, pharmaceuticals,
and utilities. Indirect costs are more general expenses of the business, such as
interest on loans, depreciation, and the return on equity capital of proprietary
hospitals.
33 (3) The determination of reasonable cost of services must be based on
cost related to the care of beneficiaries of title XVIII of the Act ...
It includes both direct and indirect costs and normal standby costs. How-
ever, where the provider's operating costs include amounts not related to
patient care, specifically not reimbursable under the program . . . such
amounts will not be allowable.
42 C.F.R. §405.451(c)(3) (1981).
34 Rapides, 435 F. Supp. at 388; see Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 13-21,
Harper-Grace Hospitals v. Schweiker, No. 81-1305 (6th Cir.) (date brief submitted
July 14, 1981). Reimbursement for depreciation is provided for in 42 C.F.R.
§§ 405.415-.418 (1981).
35 435 F. Supp. at 388.
36 638 F.2d 1381, 1386-87 (6th Cir. 1981).
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2. Reimbursement Is Prohibited by the Medicare
Regulations and Statutes
The definition of reasonable (reimbursable) cost in the regu-
lations excludes costs "specifically not reimbursable under the
[Medicare] program... ." 37 Thus, even assuming that Hill-Burton
care is a legitimate indirect cost, reimbursement is arguably pro-
hibited by the regulation precluding reimbursement for charity
care 38 and by the statutory provision that prohibits reimbursement
for services for which the patient has no legal obligation to pay.39
a. Charity Care Is Not a Reimbursable Cost
Medicare regulations have provided from the outset that bad
debts, charity, and courtesy allowances are not to be included as
allowable costs.40 HHS has consistently taken the position that the
charity exclusion applies to Hill-Burton free care.41
The providers and two dissenting PRRB members dispute this
interpretation, relying on a literal interpretation of the term "char-
ity." They argue that care provided to the indigent to fulfill Hill-
Burton obligations cannot be considered charity because it is not
"voluntary." 42 Although the original Hill-Burton regulations were
3742 C.F.R. § 405.451(c)(3) (1981).
3842 C.F.R. §405.420(a) (1981).
3942 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(2) (1976).
4 OThe original regulations were published at 31 Fed. Reg. 14,813 (1966)
(codified at 42 C.F.R. § 405.420 (1981)). The current regulations are substan-
tially the same in relevant part:
(a) Principle. Bad debts, charity, and courtesy allowances are de-
ductions from revenue and are not to be included in allowable cost ....
(b) Definitions ....
(2) Charity allowances. Charity allowances are reductions in charges
made by the provider of services because of the indigence or medical
indigence of the patient.
(c) Normal accounting treatment: Reduction in revenue. Bad debts,
charity, and courtesy allowances represent reductions in revenue. The
failure to collect charges for services rendered does not add to the cost of
providing the services. Such costs have already been incurred in the
production of the services.
42 C.F.R. § 405.420 (1981).
4 1 See, e.g., Indiana Hosp., [1979-2 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEmcAm
GOIDE (CCH) 130,133, at 9898-99; Harper Hosp. Div. v. Blue Cross Ass'n, [1980
Transfer Binder] MEDrcApm & MEDCAD GImE (CCH) 9 30,456, at 9789 (Feb. 21,
1980).
42 Indiana Hosp., [1979-2 Transfer Binder] MEDicAR & MEDicAm GUIDE
(CCH) f30,133, at 9896, 9900 (dissenting opinion of H. Joseph Curl). Subse-
quently, James Houdek joined Curl in dissenting on these grounds. See, e.g.,
Iredell Memorial Hosp. v. Blue Cross Ass'n, [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE
& MEDICAI GUIDE (CCH) 130,930, at 9866, 9868-69 (Mar. 6, 1981), rev'd, 4
MErcARE & MEDicAD GUmE (CCH) 131,837, at 9207 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 7, 1982).
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precatory with respect to the provision of free care, subsequent
regulations43 and court rulings have transformed the provision of
free care into a definite legal obligation." The argument is now
complete: because free care is legally required, it is not a voluntary
act and therefore cannot be considered charity. The courts holding
that reimbursement is proper have accepted this analysis.45
Superficially, the providers' argument appears persuasive-
charity normally presupposes voluntarism. This argument, how-
ever, does not withstand closer scrutiny. Resort to the dictionary
definition of charity is inappropriate because the regulation pro-
vides its own definition of the term: "Charity allowances are reduc-
tions in charges made by the provider of services because of the
indigence or medical indigence of the patient."46 The definition
is not limited to voluntary reductions in charges; it simply refers
to reductions made because of indigence. Hill-Burton beneficiaries
are by definition indigent or medically indigent.
47
The inclusion of Hill-Burton care in the charity exclusion is
supported by more than a literal reading of the language of the
regulation. The existence of the free care obligation, although
admittedly not in the more structured form it ultimately took,
predated the charity provision.48 An exception to the definition
of charity that would permit reimbursement for Hill-Burton care
could have been written into the regulation easily.
49
The inclusion of Hill-Burton free care as charity is consistent
with the other forms of charity included in the definition. Hill-
Burton free care may be a legal obligation, but so may free care
provided pursuant to requirements of a local or state statute. Pro-
viding charity care to the indigent may be "involuntary" for some
3 See supra notes 5-9. See also Indiana Hosp., [1979-2 Transfer Binder]
MEDICARE & MEDIcAm GUIDE (CCH) ff 30,133, at 9900 (H. Joseph Curl, dissenting,
noting that "[t]he amount of the free care at the time of passage of... Hill-Burton
... was vaguely stated but subsequent regulations have clarified both the amount
of the care and the manner in which it will be delivered").
44 Sane v. Hospital Auth., 502 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1974); Euresti v. Stenner,
458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972) (the indigent may bring a civil action to compel
Hill-Burton aided facilities to comply with free care obligations).
45 See, e.g., Johnson County Memorial Hosp. v. Schweiker, 527 F. Supp. 1134,
1140-41 (S.D. Ind. 1981); Metropolitan Medical Center v. Harris, 524 F. Supp.
630, 634 (D. Minn. 1981).
4642 C.F.R. § 405.420(b)(2) (1981).
4742 C.F.R. § 124.506 (1981) details the criteria for defining those persons
unable to pay for health care.
48 Harper-Grace Hosp. v. Schweiker, [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MEDARE &
MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) f 31,037, at 10,216, 10,218 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 1, 1981).
49Cf. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274-75 (1974) (courts may
place great weight on longstanding agency interpretation of a statute where Con-
gress has reenacted the statute without pertinent change).
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hospitals in that it may be required by the hospitals' charters.50
Free care also may be involuntary in the sense that it is often re-
quired in order to qualify the institution for a favorable tax status.5
The varying motivations for providing free care do not prevent its
classification as charity; the attempt to distinguish Hill-Burton from
other forms of charity on the basis of voluntarism, therefore, is ill-
founded.5 2 The hospitals' objection is more appropriately directed
at the policy on reimbursement for charity care, bad debts, and
courtesy allowances, rather than at the inclusion of Hill-Burton care
within the definition of charity. As will be shown, however, the
exclusion of free care from reimbursement is consistent with Medi-
care cost principles as well as with the purpose of the Medicare
Act.
b. The Medicare Act Directly Prohibits Reimbursement
for Hill-Burton Care
Reimbursement for Hill-Burton care is prohibited not only by
the charity exclusion but also by an express prohibition in the
Medicare Act that states: "[N]o payment may be made under
[Medicare] for any expenses incurred for items or services . . . for
which the individual furnished such items or services has no legal
obligation to pay, and which no other person... [because of, e.g.,
a prepayment plan] has a legal obligation to provide or pay for." 53
Recipients of Hill-Burton free care are not legally obligated to pay
for the services they receive.5 4 The Health Care Finance Adminis-
trator has reversed PRRB decisions allowing Medicare reimburse-
50 Cf. Orange County v. Orlando Osteopathic Hosp., 66 So. 2d 285, 286, 288
(Fla. 1953) (hospital's policy was not to deny treatment to any patient because
of inability to pay).
51 See Bromberg, The Charitable Hospital, 20 CATH. U.L. REV. 237, 237
(1970). See generally Comment, Federal Income Tax Exemption for Private
Hospitals, 36 FonDHum L. REv. 747 (1968).
52 The legislative history does not distinguish between types of free care based
on the motivation for providing the care. Rather, it refers generally to the pro-
vision of care to those unable to pay, including charity and indigent patients.
S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-37 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1943, 1977-78. The status of charity care as a "reduction in
revenue" rather than an additional cost provides added support for including Hill-
Burton care within the definition. See infra text accompanying note 55. As a
matter of cost accounting there is no difference between Hill-Burton and other
forms of charity care.
5342 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(2) (1976).
-4 A premise of the providers' argument that Hill-Burton care is not charity is
that the hospitals have no right to collect for uncompensated services rendered
under Hill-Burton. Indiana Hosp., [1979-2 Transfer Binder] MEDrCaM & MEDICAID
GUIDE (CCH) 130,133, at 9896.
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ment, relying on this express statutory exclusion.55 The courts that
have addressed the issue to date have split. In Saint Mary of
Nazareth Hospital Center v. HHS,56 the court held that the "blanket
prohibition against payment from Medicare funds for certain serv-
ices . . . clearly encompasses the Hill-Burton free care costs since
by definition the indigents who received [the] care were not obli-
gated to pay for it." In Iredell Memorial Hospital, Inc. v.
Schweiker,57 the court reached a contrary result. Although the
court agreed that the Hill-Burton patients have no legal obligation
to pay for their care, it found the second clause of the section, which
requires that no other person have a legal obligation to provide or
pay for the patient's care, controlling on the issue. The court rea-
soned that the hospital itself had a legal obligation to provide the
care under the Hill-Burton Act and therefore the section did not
bar reimbursement.58 Significantly, the court elsewhere in the
opinion also declared that hospitals have no legal obligation to
pay for the care that they provide pursuant to Hill-Burton obliga-
tions.59
The court's distinction between "pay for" and "provide" is
somewhat strained. Nothing in the limited legislative history sug-
gests that Congress drew such a distinction.60 Rather, the terms
"pay for" and "provide" were probably equivalent, the latter being
included simply to make clear that prepayment plans will not be
affected by the exclusion.
The Medicare & Medicaid Guide suggests another argument
against applying the exclusion to Hill-Burton. It notes that the
exclusion is properly understood as referring only to those services
provided to anyone without charge, such as free chest x-rays or
blood pressure tests: "This exclusion does not apply where items
and services are furnished an indigent individual without charge
because of his inability to pay, if the provider, physician, or sup-
plier bills other patients to the extent that they are able to pay." 61
55 Gaston Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Ass'n, [1981-2 Transfer Binder]
MEDIcARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 131,637, at 10,108, 10,111 (Nov. 7, 1981),
rev'g Gaston Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Blue Cross Ass'n., [1981-2 Transfer Binder]
MEDIcARE & MEDICAID GUIME (CCH) 131,545, at 9686 (Sept. 11, 1981).
564 MEnIcAnE & MEDicAID GUrnE (CCH) f31,821, at 9108, 9110 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 14, 1982).
574 ME IcRE & MEDicAro GumE (CCH) f31,837, at 9207 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 7,
1982).
5s Id. 1f 31,837, at 9210.
69 Id.
60 See S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-37, 48-49 (1965), reprinted
in 1965 U.S. ConE CoNG. & A. NEws 1943, 1977-78, 1989-90.
61 1 ME IcAE & MEanicAm GUIDE (CCH) 14035.33, at 1414.
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No cases are cited to support this interpretation. The only ex-
ample cited in the legislative history-free chest x-rays provided by
health organizations-is consistent with the Guide interpretation.62
The language of the exclusion, focusing as it does on the nature
of the obligation of the individual or other party to pay rather
than on the type of service provided, seriously undercuts the Guide
interpretation. But both the court's analysis in Iredell and the
Guide interpretation raise sufficient doubt about the proper inter-
pretation of the exclusion to make appropriate a consideration of
the propriety of Hill-Burton reimbursement under the general
principles of Medicare.
C. Reimbursement for Hill-Burton Care Contravenes the
Fundamental Principles of Medicare
The exclusion of Hill-Burton care from reimbursement is
rooted in the basic purpose of the Medicare Act. Medicare was
designed not as a universal national health plan, but as a limited
plan to benefit only certain categories of people.63 This intention
finds expression in the Act's provision that "the necessary costs of
efficiently delivering covered services to individuals covered by
[Medicare] will not be borne by individuals not so covered, and the
costs with respect to individuals not so covered will not be borne
by [Medicare]." 6 This focus on the status of the recipient of the
care provides a basis for the general charity exclusion and the denial
of reimbursement for Hill-Burton care.65 The rationale that free
care is provided to ineligible persons (persons "not so covered") and
therefore is not a reimbursable cost under Medicare, however, was
presented to and rejected by the court in Rapides:
Plaintiff does not assert that the free care beneficiaries are
medicare recipients and that their costs are reimbursable
as such. Rather, plaintiff argues that the costs of free
care are incidental allowable costs, similar in nature to
interest or depreciation, neither of which go directly to
benefit medicare patients, but which nonetheless inure as
a residual benefit to them and are thus compensable on
62 S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1943, 1989.
63 The Senate Report indicates that the purpose of the Act is "to provide a
hospital insurance program for the aged ....- S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. Nmvs 1943, 1943
(emphasis added).
6442 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A)(i) (1976).
65 See, e.g., Indiana Hosp., [1979-2 Transfer Binder] MEDicARE & MEDicAI
GI DE (CCH) 130,133, at 9898.
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that basis. Consequently, defendant's response [is] . . .
misplaced .... 66
The court in Presbyterian 67 found the Rapides logic persuasive and
went on to state that it was "unable to distinguish [Hill-Burton free
care] expenses in principle from interest and other indirect costs" 68
(such as depreciation, interest, research costs, and return on equity).
Hill-Burton care, however, can be distinguished from the other
indirect expenses the Presbyterian court cited. The distinguishing
factor is that Hill-Burton "costs" are not costs at all, but rather are
reductions in revenue under the Medicare accounting system. The
Medicare regulations concerning bad debts, charity, and courtesy
allowances explain the reasoning: "The failure to collect charges
for services rendered does not add to the cost of providing the serv-
ices. Such costs have already been incurred in the production of
the services." 69 Thus, to consider the expense of providing care
under the Hill-Burton Act an indirect cost would be to allow a
double counting of the actual costs of providing service.70 As the
PRRB explained in Iredell Memorial Hospital v. Blue Cross
Association: 71
The assumption of a Hill-Burton obligation by the pro-
vider does not convert the uncollected revenues into addi-
tional reimbursable costs under the Medicare principles
of reimbursement. In the cost finding process, costs in-
curred by the provider in rendering care to all patients-
Medicare, Medicaid, private insurors [sic], self-pay, and
non-pay-are first determined. These total costs ...are
then apportioned to various classes of patients and Medi-
care pays its share of these costs.72
The Social Security Act vested broad discretion in the Secre-
tary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)
to establish cost accounting regulations, but did require "the
Secretary [to] consider, among other things, the principles generally
applied by national organizations or established prepayment organi-
66 435 F. Supp. at 388.
67638 F.2d at 1386.
681d. 1387.
6942 C.F.R. § 405.420(c) (1981).
70 For an illustration, see infra Appendix.
71 [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MEDiAnE & MFDicAm GumE (CCH) ff 30,930,
at 9866.
72 Id. 9868. For an illustration of this method of computation, see infra
Appendix.
73 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A) (1976).
[Vol. 130:89.2
HILL-BURTON FREE CARE
zations." 74 The American Hospital Association's Principles of
Reimbursement had long stated that bad debts, charity, and cour-
tesy allowances were not costs, but rather reductions from revenue.71
The Principles did not deal with the question of the status of Hill-
Burton care per se. Nonetheless, the accounting principle of dis-
tinguishing between costs and reductions in revenue had been
accepted by the American Hospital Association and by Blue Cross.7 6
The treatment of charity was so settled that the drafters of the first
Medicare reimbursement guidelines considered excluding charity
from allowable costs a "relatively easy" issue.
7
7
The position that Hill-Burton free care is a reimbursable
"cost" is grounded in the notion that such care creates a definite
financial obligation for the hospital. As the PRRB states in Iredell,
however, "[t]he basic root of the issue is that the basis of Medicare
payments is actual operating costs as defined by Medicare princi-
ples of reimbursement-not the provider's financial require-
ments." 78 In fact, Medicare does not reimburse for a variety of
expenditures that arguably benefit Medicare patients indirectly.
For example, if advertising increases the general usage of the hos-
pital, that lowers the per diem costs of all patients, including
Medicare patients. Yet Medicare does not reimburse for such ex-
penses.7 9 Similarly, medical research costs are not reimbursable.8 0
This failure to reimburse what arguably are costs of the na-
tional health care delivery system stems from the nature of Medi-
care. The Social Security Amendments of 1965 were designed not
to satisfy the financial needs of the health care system but to pro-
vide a form of insurance for eligible individuals.8 ' Congress in-
tended Medicare's contribution to the financial well-being of the
health care delivery system to be its payment of the actual costs,
74 Id.
75 Iredell, [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MEricARE & MEDicAm GumE (CCH)
g" 30,930, at 9868.
76 Reimbursement Guidelines for Medicare: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Finance, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1966).
771d. 46 (Testimony of Robert M. Ball, Commissioner of Social Security.
78 lredell, [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MEDicARE & MEDicAID GuDe (CCH)
f 30,930, at 9868.
79 Gosman v. United States, 573 F.2d 31, 38 (Ct. CL 1978). The court
noted that "it is not unreasonable to read both the Act and the general regulation-
each pointing directly to the costs incurred in serving Medicare patients-as pre-
cluding reimbursement for such indirect expenditures only tangentially or specu-
latively related to the actual care of Medicare beneficiaries." Id.
80S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1943, 1977. The report notes that "[a]vailable research
funds are generally ample to support important basic medical research." Id.
81 Id. 1-3, 1965 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEws at 1943-44.
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both direct and indirect, of care to eligible patients who otherwise
would be unable to pay. Noting that paying patients are charged
for a portion of the cost of care for nonpaying patients, the Senate
report accompanying the Medicare bill emphasized that
careful consideration [was given] to the question of the
effect that the proposed program would have on charges to
other paying patients. The insurance system will reduce
the losses of hospital income from bad debts or for care of
free or part-pay aged patients which might otherwise be
included in charges to other paying patients by paying the
full cost, except for the deductible and coinsurance, for
substantially all patients over 65.82
Thus Medicare would contribute by paying for otherwise non-
paying Medicare eligibles, not by paying any portion of the cost of
ineligible nonpaying patients. As the PRRB explained:
Since Congress was, in effect, removing from local com-
munities and voluntary hospitals the burden of caring for
most of the medically indigent, it rightfully expected that
those communities and voluntary hospitals would con-
tinue to provide a certain amount of charity care to those
indigents who would not be covered by either the Medi-
care or Medicaid Acts.83
Thus the argument that Medicare is not paying its fair share
of the costs of nonpaying patients, including Hill-Burton patients,
overlooks the basic purpose of the Medicare Act. To reimburse
hospitals for Hill-Burton care would enlarge the Act in a manner
Congress did not intend.
II. REIMBURSEMENT BY MEDICARE IS INCONSISTENT
WITH THE HILL-BURTON AcT
Perhaps the most obvious and fundamental objection to per-
mitting reimbursement by Medicare for Hill-Burton free care is
that such reimbursement would subvert a basic purpose of the Hill-
Burton Act. In exchange for receiving funds from the federal
government, facilities agree to provide a reasonable volume of care
to the indigent.m Insofar as the facilities charge the cost of such
care to the Medicare program, they are avoiding a portion of their
82Id. 36-37, 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NLvs at 1977 (emphasis added).
83 Florida Hosp. Group Appeal v. Blue Cross Ass'n, [1980 Transfer Binder]
MEDcAm & MErncAm Gurm. (CCH) 1 30,374, at 9415, 9422 (Dec. 17, 1979).
8442 U.S.C. §291c(e) (1976).
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obligations under the Hill-Burton Act. As the court in Harper-
Grace Hospitals v. Schweiker65 stated, "[t]o allow reimbursement
for free care provided as a condition to a [construction] grant ...
seems to, in fact, allow a 'double dip' into the funding provided by
the Government." 8 Moreover, Medicare reimbursement conflicts
not only with the underlying purpose of the Hill-Burton Act, but
also with existing Hill-Burton regulations.
A. Hill-Burton Regulations Preclude Medicare
Reimbursement for Hill-Burton Free Care
The Hill-Burton Act gives the Secretary of the HHS (formerly
HEW) the power to establish regulations concerning the provision
of a "reasonable volume of services to persons unable to pay" by
facilities receiving Hill-Burton funds.87 The current regulations
provide that a facility can comply with its free care obligations by
providing "uncompensated services" at a level not less than three
per cent of its operating costs (excluding Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursement) or ten per cent of the amount of federal assistance
received under the Hill-Burton program,8 8 whichever is less. The
regulations also provide that "[a]ny amount that the facility has
received, or is entitled to receive, from a third party insurer or
under a governmental program" 89 may not be included in com-
puting the uncompensated services the facility provides.
This provision, excluding from the definition of uncompen-
sated services any amount reimbursable under a federal program,
has appeared in basically the same form in the regulations since
1972.90
The hospitals' attempt to obtain Medicare reimbursement may
seem puzzling when the effect of reimbursement apparently would
be to disqualify such care from being counted towards Hill-Burton
obligations. This apparent anomaly, however, does not render the
issue moot. First, the Hill-Burton regulation quoted above does
not affect those hospitals (such as Presbyterian Hospital of Dallas)
85 [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MEDICAE & MEDICAID GuDE (CCH) If31,037,
at 10,216 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 1, 1981).
80 Id. 10,219.
6742 U.S.C. §291c(e) (1976).
8842 C.F.R. § 124.503(a) (1981).
8942 C.F.R. §124.509 (1981) (emphasis added). The regulation makes
clear that Medicare is included within the definition of "governmental program":
"(d) Any amount for which reimbursement would be available under a govern-
mental program (such as medicare or medicaid) in which the facility, although
eligible to do so... does not participate." Id. § 124.509(d).
90 See 42 C.F.R. §53.111(f)(2) (1980) (first printed at 42 C.F.R. §53.111
(f) (2) (1972) with minor word changes thereafter).
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that satisfied their Hill-Burton obligations via the "open door"
option, which was available until September 1, 1979. 91 Under this
option, hospitals agreed to treat all patients without regard to their
ability to pay. Because compliance under the open door option
was not tied to a specific level of uncompensated care, the exclusion
of care reimbursed by Medicare had no practical effect.
Second, one could argue that the terms of the Hill-Burton
regulations cannot control the interpretation of the Medicare Act.
Admittedly, the Hill-Burton regulations do not themselves answer
the question of reimbursement under Medicare. If, however, the
regulations properly reflect Hill-Burton principles, applying the
rule of construction requiring statutes to read in a complementary
fashion if possible 92 would indicate that denial of reimbursement
is called for.
In addition to the outright ban on including as free care any
services that are reimbursed under a governmental program, the
definition of costs employed in the Hill-Burton regulations indi-
cates the impropriety of Medicare reimbursement. The regulations
permit hospitals to satisfy their free care obligations by providing
services to the indigent equal to three per cent of the annual oper-
ating costs of the hospital.93 Operating costs are defined as the total
operating expenses of a facility minus any amount reimbursed by
Medicare or Medicaid.
94
The three per cent presumptive compliance figure was arrived
at on the assumption that Medicare and Medicaid would not re-
imburse any portion of the cost of Hill-Burton free care.95 Al-
91 The 1979 regulations, codified at 42 C.F.R. § 12 4 .5 03(a) (1981), eliminated
the so-called "open-door option." Under this option hospitals agreed not to turn
anyone away for want of the ability to pay for services. For a discussion of the
reasons for its elimination, see Appendix I to the Final Rules, 44 Fed. Beg. 29,372,
29,384-86 (1979).
92 Administrator, FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255, 263, 265-66 (1975).
9342 C.F.R. § 124.503(a)(i) (1981).
941d. § 124.502. The following calculation illustrates the method of computing
the amount of free care required for presumptive compliance:
Total operating costs $1,000,000
Amount reimbursed by
Medicare and Medicaid -$300,000
Net operating costs $700,000
x 3% (presumptive compliance
percentage) x .03
Hill-Burton obligation $21,000
95 Rose, The Hill-Burton Act--The Interim Regulations and Service to the
Poor: A Study in Public Interest Litigation, 6 Cr.EAmNGHOum. Rv. 309, 310 n.18
(1972). It was apparently deemed unfair to apply the percentage to the entire
patient population when Medicare and Medicaid would not reimburse any of the
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though one may question whether the reduction for Medicare
reimbursement was necessary,96 permitting reimbursement would
distort the hospitals' obligations by shifting to Medicare a portion
of what is already a reduced amount of free care.
97
Thus, the Hill-Burton regulations preclude Medicare reim-
bursement. Moreover, reimbursement is inconsistent with the
general purpose of the Hill-Burton Act.
B. Reimbursement for Hill-Burton Free Care Is Inconsistent
With the Intent of the Hill-Burton Act
The fundamental problem with permitting Medicare reim-
bursement for free care provided pursuant to Hill-Burton obliga-
tions is that it would undermine one of the central purposes of the
Hill-Burton Act. It would effectively permit the hospitals to shift
back to the federal government a portion of the cost they agreed
to assume in order to receive the initial Hill-Burton funds. This
clash with the purpose of the Hill-Burton Act prompted the district
court in Harper-Grace to "conclude that Congress [did not intend]
for the Medicare program to absorb the cost of indigent care pro-
vided as required by Hill-Burton." 98
The objection to the "double-dip" into federal government
funds-once for the Hill-Burton funds and a second time for the
cost of the Hill-Burton free care obligation-is premised on the
assumption that the hospitals originally obligated themselves to
assume responsibility for financing the care provided to the indigent
as required by Hill-Burton. In fact, one commentator has sug-
gested that the Hill-Burton Act was never designed to obligate
the hospitals to finance care for the indigent. 99 In Newsom v. Van-
derbilt University,100 the Sixth Circuit reversed a lower court's
costs of the free care. Id. In the discussion accompanying the publication of
the 1979 Final Rules, HEW expressly referred to the Medicare policy of consider-
ing Hill-Burton care nonreimbursable charity care. 44 Fed. Reg. 29,409 (1979).
V6 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 95, at 310 n.18. If the rationale for the reduction
is that the paying patients otherwise would be unduly burdened, see supra note
95, Rose argues that reduction may not be necessary because Medicare and
Medicaid have already reduced the burden on paying patients by funding the care
of formerly nonpaying patients. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
97The presumptive compliance option of 10% of the amount of Hill-Burton
funds received does not contain an express provision for the Medicare exclusion
policy. See 42 C.F.R. § 124.503(a) (ii) (1981). Because the options were de-
signed to be roughly equivalent, however, the ten per cent figure probably includes
an implied adjustment.
98Harper-Grace, [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MEDIcARE & MEDIcAD GUIDE
(CCH) 31,037, at 10,219.
99 See Due Process, supra note 5, at 1476, 1479.
300 653 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir. 1981).
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ruling that indigent patients had a constitutionally protected entitle-
ment to free services at Hill-Burton facilities. 01 In reaching its
decision, the court relied in part on its conclusion that "[t]he legis-
lative history of the free services provision of the Hill-Burton Act
of 1946 demonstrates that Congress had no intention of requiring
the hospitals to furnish a certain amount of free care." 102 This
conclusion appears to be based on two other findings: (1) that Hill-
Burton was intended only to provide construction funds, not to
combat the problem of health care for the indigent, and (2) that
the Act did not intend to make the hospitals liable for funding the
provision of free care. 10 3 Both of these findings are of questionable
validity.
The position that Hill-Burton was simply the first step-the
construction phase-of national health care legislation and did not
address the problem of providing services finds some support in the
historical background surrounding the passage of the Act. 04 The
original version of the bill that became the Hill-Burton Act did
not contain the free care or community service obligations. 1 5  It
was originally contemplated that Hill-Burton would deal only with
construction funding; other problems, including the funding of
care, would be dealt with in separate bills.10 6 The proponents of
the more limited reading of the Hill-Burton Act draw heavily for
support from testimony at the Senate hearings on the Hill-Burton
101 Id. 1117, 1121, 1122.
102 Id. 1119 n.4.
103 Id. 1117, 1120. "A close reading of the legislative history indicates that
while there was some concern about providing health care for the poor, having
hospitals carry the burden by providing free services is not the answer. The
Hill-Burton Act was only a first step to help construct the necessary facilities."
Id. 1117.
104 President Truman sent a message to Congress on Nov. 19, 1945, urging the
adoption of comprehensive health care legislation. The President's plan called for
five phases of legislation: (1) construction of hospitals and related facilities; (2)
expansion of public, maternal, and child health services; (3) medical education
and research; (4) prepayment of medical costs, and (5) protection against loss in
wages from sickness and disability. Message from the President of the United
States-Health Legislation, 91 CoNG. Rxc. 10,817, 10,818-20 (1945). In his
opening statement at the Senate hearings on the Hill-Burton Act, Senator Hill, its
principal sponsor, indicated that the legislation was directed at the first of the
problems identified by President Truman-the need for adequate hospital and
public health facilities-and as such was only a first step toward solving the nation's
health care problems. Hospital Construction Act: Hearings on S. 191 Before the
Senate Comm. on Education & Labor, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1945) [hereinafter
cited as 1945 Hearings].
105 1945 Hearings, supra note 104, at 1-6.
106 See, e.g., S. 1050, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 4, 9 (1945), summarized at
91 CONG. REc. 4924-25 (May 24, 1945); H.R. 3293, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
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bill.10 7 Although statements at those hearings characterized the bill
as one limited to construction, 08 relying on that testimony is a mis-
take because the amendments regarding the free care provision were
added after the hearings on the bill in its original form. 0 9 The
meaning of the free care provisions logically cannot be controlled
by discussions predating their existence.
Although no legislative history directly pertains to the amend-
ments, which were added during subcommittee executive session," 0
commentators have suggested that the free care and community
service requirements were added out of concern that the other por-
tions of the national health legislation would not be passed."' Nor
does anything in the legislative history of the Act undercut the clear
statutory language. The Act as originally passed provided:
[T]he Surgeon General . . . shall by general regulation
prescribe-
(f) That the State plan ... shall provide for adequate
hospital facilities for persons unable to pay therefor. Such
regulation may require that before approval of any appli-
cation for a hospital or addition to a hospital is recom-
mended by a State agency, assurance shall be received by
the State from the applicant that . . . (2) there will be
made available in each such hospital or addition to a hos-
pital a reasonable volume of hospital services to persons
unable to pay therefor, but an exception shall be made if
such a requirement is not feasible from a financial stand-
point. 12
This provision clearly requires that services be provided to
those patients unable to pay. Although clause (2) is permissive and
107 See, e.g., Newsom, 653 F.2d at 1117-19 n.4; Due Process, supra note 5,
at 1475-80; The Hill-Burton Act, supra note 6, at 320.
108 The Surgeon General, Dr. Thomas Parran, testified: "S. 191 is silent on the
whole question of medical care for people of low incomes. Apparently this was
a deliberate omission on the theory that the first and most necessary step is to plan
for constructing the most-needed facilities .... ." 1945 Hearings, supra note 104,
at 64. Accord, id. 31 (testimony of Dr. Donald C. Smezer, President of the
American Hospital Association).
109 S. Ra,. No. 674, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, 8-9 (1945).
l Id. 1-2.
U' See Rose, supra note 4, at 170; Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and
Administrative Law: A Structural Approach, 88 YALE L.J. 243, 266 (1978).
:
2 Hill-Burton Act, Pub. L. No. 725, § 622, 60 Stat. 1040, 1042-43 (1946)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1976)) (emphasis added).
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subject to varying interpretations,113 the requirement in the first
clause that the facilities be available to the indigent is mandatory.
In any event, the Surgeon General did issue regulations requiring
that assurances of a reasonable volume of care be made available. 114
Some have argued that the Hill-Burton Act did not intend to
place on hospitals the burden of financing care for the indigent.115
It is certainly true that the Act did not intend to place the entire
burden on the hospitals. This is apparent from the legislative his-
tory 116 and the limitation of free care to a "reasonable volume." 117
Yet the hearings show that the hospitals had been providing a sig-
nificant amount of free care to the indigent prior to the passage of
Hill-Burton." 8 The requirement that hospitals provide a reason-
able volume of free care can most logically be seen as an effort to
insure that they would continue the policy of providing free care
to the indigent.
The initial regulations provided that the free care could "be
paid for wholly or partly out of public funds or contributions of
individuals and private and charitable organizations such as com-
munity chests or [could] be contributed at the expense of the hos-
pital itself." 119 Permitting the hospitals to seek support in meeting
the entire cost of providing a reasonable volume of free care is
consistent with the statutory intent. The Act intended to encour-
age the continued availability of traditional, local, and community
charity funding.
120
113 The court in Newsom reads the second provision to mean that the hospitals
themselves are financially obligated for the cost of Hill-Burton care only if the
Surgeon General exercises his prerogative under (2). 653 F.2d at 1117. A more
plausible reading, however, is that the Surgeon General must require the state plan
to provide for adequate facilities for those unable to pay. Under this view, what
is permissive is not the hospital's obligation, but the requirement that each hospital
give an assurance before receiving funds.
114 12 Fed. Reg. 6176, 6179 (1947) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 53.63 (Supp.
1947)).
115 Newsom, 653 F.2d at 1117 & n.4; Due Process, supra note 5, at 1476.
116 See 1945 Hearings, supra note 104, at 286. At no time during the hearings
did anyone suggest that the hospitals were to bear the total cost of care for the
indigent. Repeated references were made to the then-existing combination of fund-
ing sources-state, local, and charitable-and the participants implied that all of
those sources, in addition to the hospitals, would continue to provide funds.
117 See supra text accompanying note 3.
118 The amount of care provided to the indigent was estimated variously at
33% of the total medical and surgical cases, 1945 Hearings, supra note 104, at 65
(testimony of Dr. Parran concerning pre-World War II years), and at 20%, id.
191 (estimate by Senator Taft). Most of this care, however, was paid for by local
communities and by states. Id. 65.
11942 C.F.R. § 53.63 (Supp. 1947).
12
0 In response to questioning from Senator Murray, Dr. Smelzer stated that
provision of care for those unable to pay "will have to be done at the local level."
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This does not mean, however, that hospitals bear no financial
responsibility. for providing free care. The statutory section per-
mitting a reduction in the volume of free care in the event of a
showing that furnishing such care is not financially feasible 121 indi-
cates an intention to obligate the hospital to finance free care to the
extent that it is financially possible.
122
Nor does allowing the use of other sources to finance free care
obligations indicate that reimbursement by Medicare also would
be proper. The initial regulation can be read as being limited
to local and state funding.123 This is consistent with the intent of
Hill-Burton. Although some Senators advocated the use of federal
funds to finance care for the poor,124 they were unsuccessful in their
attempt to have such a provision included.125 To permit reim-
bursement from federal funds under Medicare, therefore, would
conflict with the intent of Hill-Burton that hospitals receiving funds
under that Act must provide in return some free care to those
unable to pay.
Ill. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND RECO MENDATIONS
As this Comment has demonstrated, Medicare reimbursement
for free care provided pursuant to Hill-Burton obligations conflicts
with the current regulations and with the intent of both the Medi-
care and Hill-Burton Acts. The question remains whether reim-
bursement would be wise as a matter of general policy. It has been
suggested, not only by the hospitals, but also by those within
HEW 26 that Medicare policy should be changed to permit reim-
bursement for Hill-Burton free care. Such a change, however,
would be ill-advised for a number of reasons.
1945 Hearings, supra note 104, at 30. Later in the hearings, Senator Ellender
indicated that the traditional sources of charity care---"the State, the county, and
communities"--could be responsible for paying for care to the indigent if federal
funding was not provided. Id. 286.
121 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
122 The Senate Report states that a waiver of the free care provision is possible
if "the hospital is financially unable to undertake such a commitment." S. RuP.
No. 674, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1945) (emphasis added).
123 See supra note 120 and text accompanying notes 119-20. Neither Medicare
nor Medicaid had been enacted when the 1947 regulations were written.
124 E.g., 1945 Hearings, supra note 104, at 190 (Senator Pepper recommended
the use of a combination of federal, state, and local funds).
1
2 5 Rosenblatt, supra note 111, at 265-66.
126 A Special Assistant to the General Counsel of HEW recommended in a
February 1979 memorandum that HCFA change its policy and permit reimburse-
ment. Florida Hosp. Group Appeal v. Blue Cross Ass'n, [1980 Transfer Binder]
MEDICARE & MEDIctn GunmE (CCH) V30,374, at 9415 (Dec. 17, 1979).
1982]
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First, reimbursement would place an added burden on an
already strained Social Security financing system.127 The additional
expense of Hill-Burton reimbursement would be particularly ill-
timed in light of recent moves to cut the Social Security budget by
reducing benefits. 28 The drain on Medicaid funding, if Medicare
reimbursement were to trigger Medicaid reimbursement, would
also be devastating. To place a burden estimated at 50-80% of
$400 million per year 129 (the amount of Hill-Burton uncompen-
sated services required) on the funding systems at this time could
be disastrous. 30
Reimbursement also would be undesirable because it would
result in a net reduction in the amount of care available to the
poor. Rather than serving as an addition to Medicare and Medi-
caid, Hill-Burton free care would reduce the funds available under
those programs to the extent that they reimburse providers. More-
over, reimbursement for Hill-Burton free care would relieve the
hospitals of their legal obligation to provide a "reasonable volume"
of care to the indigent in exchange for government funding. It
has been suggested that reimbursement may nonetheless be desirable
in order to obtain voluntary compliance with free care obliga-
tions.' 3 If one assumes that the current regulations cannot or will
not be enforced by the current administration, then reimbursement
may result in an actual increase in the amount of care available to
those unable to pay by encouraging otherwise reluctant hospitals
to comply with their Hill-Burton obligations.
The problem with this scenario is that it contemplates the
Executive acting in a manner inconsistent with the intent of the
statute. In the National Health Planning and Resources Develop-
ment Act of 1974 132 (which provided new funding for the Hill-
Burton Act), Congress made clear that it intended the free care and
127 The drain would be further exacerbated if reimbursement for Hill-Burton
free care triggered reimbursement for other "reasonable costs," such as charity
care, provided pursuant to state or local laws. See supra text accompanying notes
50-51.
12
8 See 4 hmicAnE & MEncxmr GtUmE (CCH) Last Report Letter May 5,
1981 (discussing proposed cutbacks).
129 Florida Hosp., [1980 Transfer Binder] MzoicARt & MEDicAm GUmE (CCH)
1f 30,374, at 9415.
13o The financial condition of the Medicare and Medicaid funding systems
undermines the rationale suggested by the Special Assistant to the General Counsel
of HEW, see supra note 126, that reimbursement would be desirable as a means
of spreading the cost of care for those unable to pay. See Florida Hospital, [1980
Transfer Binder] MEDicAm & MEDicAm GUroE (CCH) 130,374, at 9415.
131"Id.
132 Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1975) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§300q-300t (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
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community service obligations to be vigorously enforced.133 The
Executive is not free to disregard statutory mandates when adminis-
tering a law. 134 Moreover, to suggest that the hospitals should be
given a "sweetener" to induce them to comply with their legal
obligation is offensive.
Nor is it in any sense unfair to hold hospitals to their free
care obligations. At the time Hill-Burton was enacted, it was esti-
mated that 20-33% of the total services rendered were to persons
unable to pay. 3 Because the burden on the hospitals has since
been reduced by Medicare and Medicaid, 3 6 it is reasonable to
expect that some responsibility for caring for those unable to pay
should remain.
It has been suggested that Medicare reimbursement would be
warranted as a means of reducing administrative costs. 37 The pro-
vision of Hill-Burton free care could be monitored by those ad-
ministering the Medicare program, thus eliminating the need for
separate enforcement personnel. Although such a plan probably
would result in some savings, nothing would seem to prevent the
use of the Medicare reimbursement mechanism to monitor Hill-
Burton obligations in their present form. Certainly any potential
savings in administrative costs are far outweighed by the considera-
tions previously discussed.
On the whole, retention of the current reimbursement policy
is sound. The regulations, however, should be amended to remove
any doubt concerning the propriety of reimbursement. This can
be achieved simply by amending the Medicare regulations regard-
ing charity care 138 expressly to encompass care provided under Hill-
Burton. Alternatively, Congress could amend the statute expressly
to classify Hill-Burton free care as a provision of services to those
1
33 The provision of the Hill-Burton Act that the regulations "may' require
that a hospital give assurances of free care prior to receiving funds, 42 U.S.C.
§291c(e) (1976), was changed to read "shall," 42 U.S.C. §30Os-1(b)(1) (Supp.
HII 1979). The report accompanying the final bill expressly states that the change
was made because of the "sorry performance . . . in implementing a provision
which has been in law for over 20 years, and has recently been reemphasized."
S. REP. No. 1285, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 61, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CoNG. &
AD. NEws 7842, 7900. The new language applies only to funds dispersed under
the new act.
134 See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607
(1980) (invalidating OSHA regulations because Secretary of Labor disobeyed
statutory mandate to make certain findings with respect to the risk of workplace
exposure to benzene).
135 See supra note 118.
136 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
'37 Florida Hosp., E1980 Transfer Binder] MEDicAnE & MEDrCAM GumE (CCH)
ff 30,374, at 9415.
13 8 See supra note 40.
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not legally obligated to pay. The Hill-Burton regulations as they
currently exist preclude reimbursement 139 and therefore do not
need to be altered. An express statutory provision prohibiting
hospitals from including care reimbursed by Medicare would be
desirable because it would remove any doubt about the propriety of
the regulations.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued that Medicare reimbursement by
Hill-Burton costs not only would be contrary to law but also would
be inappropriate. Such reimbursement would violate existing
Medicare regulations as well as the policy underlying Medicare.
In addition, reimbursement conflicts with existing Hill-Burton
regulations and the underlying policy of that Act. Even absent
any violation of the Medicare and Hill-Burton Acts, strong policy
reasons support denying reimbursement. Undoubtedly a need
exists for a source of funding for the care of those who are unable
to pay and who do not meet the eligibility requirements of Medi-
care or Medicaid. Medicare reimbursement, however, is not the
appropriate means of accomplishing this task. The problem of
inadequate health care funding demands a more suitable solution-
for example, a national health insurance program-rather than the
distortion of existing legislation.




Both methods described below assume the following yearly
patient utilization:
Total Patient Days
Patient Days Attributable to Hill-Burton Indigents
Patient Days Attributable to Medicare Patients
Method 1 140
1. Actual total cost of providing care to all patients
(including direct and indirect costs)
2. Cost attributable to Hill-Burton patients
3. Cost attributable to non-Hill-Burton patients
4. Hypothetical cost of providing care to all patients
based on providers' contentions (lines 1 & 2)
5. Medicare patient utilization
6. Payment under current Medicare principles
of reimbursement (lines 1 & 5)













Under Method 1, as proposed by the providers in Iredell
Memorial Hospital v. Blue Cross Association,141 the costs associated
with providing Hill-Burton care, although already included in the
total cost figure in line 1, are added to the total costs as an addi-
tional, hypothetical cost.
Noting that Method 1 results in the appearance of a double
counting of Hill-Burton patient costs, the providers in John Muir
Memorial Hospital v. Blue Cross Association,'142 proposed the fol-
lowing alternative:
Method 2
1. Actual total cost
2. Medicare patient utilization under current
method (50 -- 100)
3. Proposed Medicare patient utilization excluding







140 Adapted from Iredell Memorial Hosp. v. Blue Cross Assn., [1981-1 Transfer
Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GurDE (CCH) I 30,930, at 9866, 9868 (Mar. 6,
1981).
141 Id.
1424 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) j[ 31,492, at 9443 (Aug. 26, 1981).
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Method 2 retains the actual total cost figure and instead ad-
justs the patient days (step 3). It removes the Hill-Burton patient
days in determining Medicare utilization on the theory that Hill-
Burton patients cannot properly be considered either Medicare
or non-Medicare patients. By excluding Hill-Burton patient days
from the non-Medicare patient days, the Medicare utilization per-
centage is increased. Thus, Method 2 results in virtually the same
level of reimbursement as Method 1.
